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This morning I address the contributions to the law of equal protec-
tion of the Warren Court and specifically those of Justice William J.
Brennan.' Because I am expressing my personal views, however, it is
-- only fair that I-state the basis from which I speak. I cannot pretend to
be a constitutional scholar. I have never argued a case before the
Supreme Court, nor am I a member of the Supreme Court watchers
society. My basis is my experience in the Civil Rights Division of the
Department of Justice from the summer of 1960 until the end of 1967.
For me the beacon light of the Warren Court's contribution to equal
protection rests on five opinions handed down in the short space of
about three months between early March and the middle of June 1966.2
Justice Brennan wrote one of these opinions for the Court. 3 In a sec-
ond opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, he made the first
Court pronouncement of what has become an important majority
view.4 From the standpoint of equal protection, these five opinions say
it all for me: South Carolina v. Katzenbach,5 decided March 7; Harper
v. Virginia Board of Elections,6 decided March 24; United States v.
* B.A., Princeton, 1944, LL.D. (hon.); LL.B., U. Calif. at Berkeley, 1949, citation, 1975;
LL.D. (hon.) Rutgers U., 1968, U. Wis, 1975, Wis. 1975, Yale, 1975, Brown U., 1976; Member
Legal Staff Civil Rights Div. Dept. Justice, Washington, 1960-65; Ass't Atty. Gen., 1965-67; Pres.
N.Y.C. Bd. Educ., N.Y.C., 1968-69; Pres. Bedford-Stuyvesant D. & S. Corp., Bklyn., 1968-73; Sp.
Counsel Comm. on Judiciary U.S. House Rep., Washington, D.C., 1973-74; Partner Donovan
Leisure Newton & Irvine, N.Y.C., 1975-79. Trustee, Princeton, 1969-, Bklyn. Law School,
1973-.
1. Justice Brennan was born on April 25, 1906. He graduated from Harvard University
School of Law in 1931, and became a labor law specialist. He became a New Jersey Superior
Court judge in 1949 and a judge of the Appellate Division of the N.J. Superior Court the next
year. In 1952 he was appointed to the New Jersey Supreme Court where he remained until 1956
when President Dwight D. Eisenhower appointed him to the United States Supreme Court.
In the areas of equal protection, voting, and other civil rights, Justice Brennan was in the fore-
front. He wrote the majority opinions in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Franks v. Bowman
Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (discussed in detail
in the body of this article), and NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). C. BARNES, MEN OF THE
SUPREME COURT: PROFILES OF THE JUSTICES 39-44 (1978).
2. I begin, however, with deference to Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and
with respect for Justice Brennan's opinion in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
3. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). See text accompanying notes 54-58 infra.
4. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 774 (1966). See text accompanying notes 64-67
infra.
5. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
6. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
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Price,7 decided March 28; United States v. Guest,8 decided March 28;
and, Katzenbach v. Morgan,9 decided June 13.
All of the opinions, save one,'0 dealt with the efforts-the specific
efforts--of our system of self-government to struggle up to the starting
line by breaking the hold that the caste system had on American law
and American life for so many years. All of the opinions, save one,"
dealt with wrongs to black citizens and efforts by the government to
right those wrongs. All of the opinions spoke to the central purpose of
the fourteenth' 2 and fifteenth' 3 amendments--equality for black citi-
zens within the American society. Three of the five cases dealt with
voting rights; 4 the other two with criminal statutes which were prima-
rily designed to protect black citizens seeking to exercise and to enjoy
the same rights and privileges as white citizens.' 5 Katzenbach v. Mor-
gan, one of the voting rights cases, did not concern the black minority,
but rather, involved a literacy requirement which adversely affected the
voting rights of Puerto Rican citizens who were educated in Puerto Ri-
can schools and could read only their native language. 16 Yet, even in
that case, Justice Brennan declared certain constitutional principles
that bore directly on the power of the government-at all levels--to do
whatever was necessary to eliminate, once and for all, the effects of the
caste system.'
7
7. 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
8. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
9. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
10. Id.
il. Id.
12. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966);
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966).
13. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
14. 384 U.S. 641 (1966); 383 U.S. 663 (1966); 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
15. 383 U.S. 787 (1966); 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
16. 384 U.S. 641 (1966). Morgan involved a challenge to § 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of
1965, which provides in part:
(2) No person who demonstrates that he has successfully completed the sixth primary
grade in a public school. . . or a private school. . . in which the predominant classroom
language was other than English, shall be denied the right to vote in any. . . election because
of his inability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter in the English lan-
guage ....
42 U.S.C. § 1973b(2e) (1976).
17. Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court in Morgan, applied the McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819), formulation to determine Congress' power under § 5 of the
fourteenth amendment. Justice Brennan stated that legislation enacted under § 5 of the four-
teenth amendment will withstand constitutional attack so long as the Court finds that the enact-
ment is "'appropriate legislation' to enforce the Equal Protection Clause .. is 'plainly adapted
to that end'. . . [and is] consistent with 'the letter and spirit of the constitution.'" 384 U.S. at 651.
Moreover, Justice Brennan found that "[c]orrectly viewed, § 5 is a positive grant of legislative
power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation
is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
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Together, these cases wiped out the twisted heritage that earlier
Supreme Court decisions had given to the post-civil war fourteenth
amendment,' 8 and forthrightly provided a constitutional foundation
from which the legislative branch of our government could take effec-
tive action to achieve constitutional equality for all our citizens.
During the summer of 1960, at the beginning of my work with the
Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice, the civil rights
movement had extended only to several sit-ins in the state of North
Carolina' 9 and to some initial legal skirmishes by the Department of
Justice in the deep South.20
In 1960 the Department of Justice was testing the jurisdictional scope
of the Department's authority to insure voting rights for all citizens.
For approximately the next five years, continuously up to the decisions
in 1966 to which I have referred, I was one of a small group of division
lawyers who worked on individual voting cases in the deep South (Ala.,
Miss. & La.), county by county, state by state. I confess that during
that time I was badly confused by the constitutional jungle in which we
operated. While, perhaps, I did not altogether appreciate it then, or for
that matter now, I suspect that the country was the victim of the twist-
ing convulsions of those legal precedents which, sadly enough but quite
successfully, tried to reduce the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments to
much less than they were intended to be.21 The requirement of "state
18. Eg., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The
Civil Rights Cases declared that the fourteenth amendment could not be used to prohibit private
discriminatory action such as excluding blacks from hotels, theaters, and railroads. The four-
teenth amendment did not give Congress an affirmative mandate to regulate the activities of indi-
viduals. Id. at 11-12.
In Plessy, the Court upheld a state law that required the separation of blacks and whites on
railroad coaches. The standard used was one of reasonableness, viewed in light of the established
customs, traditions, and usages, and in light of the objective of public peace and order, 163 U.S. at
550.
19. On Monday, February 1, 1960, four North Carolina A & T College students staged a sit-
in at the lunch counter of the local Woolworth store in Greensboro, North Carolina. Throughout
that week, enough students joined the original four to occupy most of the seats at the Woolworth
counter. By the following week, sit-ins were underway in a half-dozen North Carolina towns.
This incident sparked non-violent direct action protests throughout the South. T. BROOKS, WALLS
COME TUMBLING DowN: A HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 1940-1970, at 146-47
(1974).
20. By the end of February, 1960, sit-ins had spread from Greensboro, North Carolina, to
more than 12 cities in Virginia, Tennessee, North Carolina, and South Carolina. By August, sit-
ins had succeeded in ending lunch counter segregation in 27 southern cities. One hundred cities in
the south and in border states had experienced sit-ins and other forms of direct action. Id. at 147.
21. See note 18 supra. See also United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875). In Cruisk-
shank, the United States charged three persons with conspiracy to interfere with the rights and
privileges granted and secured by the Constitution. More particularly, the conspiracy was to in-
jure blacks for having voted in an election and ended in the lynching of two black men. The
Court construed the Enforcement Act of 1870, enacted after ratification of the fifteenth amend-
ment, as requiring state action. Id. at 554. See also United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875). In
Reese the Court invalidated the enforcement provisions, §§ 3 & 4, of the Enforcement Act, hold-
3
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action, ' 22 the narrow and relatively unimportant concept of the privi-
leges and immunities of national citizenship,23 and the restrictive but
necessary requirement that in judging criminal discriminatory conduct
the federal right asserted must be specific and definite 24 are some of
those concepts which, when taken together, made the fourteenth
amendment an inefficient tool for securing equal rights for all citizens.
These long established principles, along with the prevailing view that it
was within the peculiar competence of the states to determine basic
voting qualifications,25 eroded my faith that a rule of constitutional
law, as such, could contribute much toward bringing about essential
change.
For these reasons, the Department of Justice turned away from test
cases before the Supreme Court and concentrated on building strong,
detailed, and massive factual cases of voter discrimination before both
the federal district courts26 and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
ing that those provisions swept within their realm wrongful acts which lay outside the jurisdiction
of the fifteenth amendment. Id. at 221. See also James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1903). In
James the Court invalidated another section of the 1870 Enforcement Act on the ground that the
fifteenth amendment did not contemplate wrongful individual acts, but only wrongful action by
the United States or by an individual state. Id. at 136.
22. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883):
[Clivil rights, such as are guaranteed by the Constitution against State aggression, cannot be
impaired by the wrongful acts of individuals, unsupported by State authority . . . . [The]
abrogation and denial of rights, for which the States alone were or could be responsible, was
the great seminal and fundamental wrong which was intended to be remedied [by the Civil
War amendments].
Id. at 17-18. See also, United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882); United States v. Cruikshank,
92 U.S. 542 (1875).
23. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. i; U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. The fourteenth amendment
states that "[njo state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States. ... The Supreme Court has interpreted the rights secured
by this clause to include rights of national citizenship. In Twinning v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78
(1908), the Court enumerated these rights of national citizenship to include the right to travel from
state to state, to petition Congress, to vote for national offices, to enter public lands, the right to be
protected from violence while in the lawful custody of a United States marshal, and the right to
inform the United States authorities of violations of its laws. Id. at 97. These are rights "depen-
dent upon citizenship of the United States, and not citizenship of a State." Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 80 (1872).
24. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
25. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959). Justice
Douglas, for a unaninous Court, rejected a black citizen's attack on the North Carolina literacy
test. He emphasized that states had a wide discretion in setting voting qualifications:
Residence requirements, age, previous criminal record are obvious examples indicating fac-
tors which a State may take into consideration in determining the qualifications of voters.
The ability to read and write likewise has some relation to standards designed to promote
intelligent use of the ballot. Literacy and illiteracy are neutral on race, creed, color, and
sex. ...
Id. at 51 (citations omitted). Justice Douglas added: "Of course a literacy test, fair on its face,
may be employed to perpetuate that discrimination which the Fifteenth Amendment was designed
to uproot." Id. at 53.
26. E.g., United States v. State of Louisiana, 265 F. Supp. 703 (E.D. La. 1966); United States
4
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cuit.27 This tactic, we believed, offered the best chance of achieving an
honest system of self-government. We put aside the frustration of hav-
ing to prove the obvious. In order to bring about change in the deep
South, we had to get judges to express their findings of facts in strong,
powerful, and direct language that could not be misunderstood. We
respected those judges within the federal system who had the courage
to face the facts squarely, to master those facts stubbornly, and to spell
out their rulings to Southerners clearly and with style. Fortunately,
there were five judges in the Fifth Circuit who did this.28 Those judges
and what they did for this country, during that period and within the
limits of the law as then defined, will be remembered as long as our
nation survives.
Yet, after four years of strenuous activity before those judges, the
Department of Justice had accomplished very little. The federal gov-
ernment had demonstrated a seeming inability to make significant ad-
vances during the seven years since the passage of the Civil Rights Act
of 1957,29 and had been unable to make the right to vote a reality for
blacks in Mississippi, large parts of Alabama and Louisiana, and in
scattered counties in other states.3a
At about the same time-partly in frustration and partly as a result
of imagination, dedication, and courage-the Student Non-Violent Co-
ordinating Committee, known as SNCC, decided to sponsor a summer
in Mississippi. Early in the summer of 1964, three civil rights workers
were murdered in Chauva County, Mississippi. 3 ' The Justice Depart-
ment was called upon to draft a legal theory that would overcome the
old precedents inhibiting federal prosecution for civil rights crimes.32
In the following spring came Selma.31 All of the forces that had been
attacking the caste system came together and, out of Selma, came the
v. State of Mississippi, 229 F. Supp. 925 (S.D. Miss. 1964); United States v. Atkins, 210 F. Supp.
441 (S.D. Ala. 1962).
27. E.g., United States v. Duke, 332 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1964); United States v. Lynd, 321 F.2d
26 (5th Cir. 1963).
28. Judge Elbert Tuttle of Atlanta; Judge Richard T. Rives of Montgomery; Judge John Mi-
nor Wisdom of New Orleans; Judge John R. Brown of Houston; and District Court Judge Frank
Johnson, Jr. of the Middle District of Alabama.
29. Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 637 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1976)). This observation
was made in 1964 by Burke Marshall, Assistant Attorney General of the Civil Rights Division.
30. See UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: TEN YEARS
AFTER (Jan. 1975).
31. See text accompanying notes 61-62 infra.
32. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), where the Court held that an individual act,
though wrongful and harmful to a citizen, is only a private wrong or crime. The Court held that
for an individual to violate another's civil rights, he must be supported "by state authority in the
shape of laws, customs, or judicial or executive proceedings." Id. at 17.
33. For a discussion of the events that occurred in Selma, see T. BROOKS, supra note 19, at
253-57.
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Voting Rights Act of 1965. 34
Within months three cases involving the Voting Rights Act were
pending in the Supreme Court: South Carolina v. Katzenbach,3 Harper
v. Virginia Board of Elections,36 and Katzenbach v. Morgan." At the
same time, cases had been briefed and argued regarding the sufficiency
of the indictments in the two conspiracy cases, one involving the
murders of the three civil rights workers in Mississippi,38 and the other
involving the murder of Colonel Samuel A. Penn, who had been killed
in Georgia while he was driving home to Washington from an army
camp in Louisiana. 39  Thus, in the spring of 1966 a group of cases
which together held the key to an honest and effective construction of
the fourteenth amendment were presented to the Supreme Court.
In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, however, the Court considered not
the fourteenth amendment, but the constitutionality of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 under the fifteenth amendment. In that Act, Con-
gress provided for the automatic suspension of tests and devices4" pur-
suant to a triggering device4' based on historical voting statistics in
various southern states. In a revolutionary manner, Congress author-
ized the Attorney General to send federal examiners and observers to
southern counties without prior judicial approval.42 The Act also re-
flected a finding by Congress that the poll tax was a barrier to voting;
that it did not bear a reasonable relationship to any legitimate interest
the state may have had in conducting an election; and that, in some
areas, it had the purpose and effect of denying persons the right to vote
because of their race or color.43
The issue before the Court was the extent of Congress' power under
section 2 of the fifteenth amendment 4 to enforce the amendment by
appropriate legislation. The Court held that Congress' power to en-
force the amendment was not limited to preventing or redressing illegal
34. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973p (1976)).
35. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
36. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
37. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
38. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
39. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1976). Subsection (a) provides:
[N]o citizen shall be denied the right to vote. . . because of his failure to comply with any
test or device in any [covered jurisdiction]. . . unless the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia in an action for a declaratory judgment brought by such [covered juris-
diction]. . . has determined that no such test or device has been used during the seventeen
years preceding the filing of the action ....
41. Id. See Comment, Federal Intervention into Voting Rights." Sections 4(a), 4(b) and 5 ofthe
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 12 N.C. CENT. L.J. 461 (1981).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(d) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(h)(a) (1976).
44. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XV, § 2. Section 2 provides that "Congress shall have power to
enforce this article by appropriate legislation."
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conduct.45 The power could be used for prophylactic measures: Con-
gress could use any rational means to regulate or to prohibit any con-
duct that erected a barrier of discrimination in voting.'
Thus, the Court read the language of section 2 of the fifteenth
amendment in the same way that it read the necessary and proper
clause in article I of the Constitution.4  Because the several states had
traditionally held a preferred place in defining voter qualifications, 48
this principle was vitally important. It went beyond the issue before the
Court and beyond the necessary construction of section 2 of the
fifteenth amendment.
By reading into the enforcement provision of the fifteenth amend-
ment the familiar necessary and proper clause principle, that Congress
may use any rational means to effectuate constitutional prohibitions,49
the Court opened the way for a similar holding under the parallel en-
forcement provision of the fourteenth amendment.5 The question re-
mained whether Congress had the power to regulate an activity that did
not violate the prohibition of the fourteenth amendment, if that power
was exercised as a rational means of effectuating one of that amend-
ment's prohibitions. The holding in South Carolina v. Katzenbach sug-
gested that there was another answer to the old argument that Congress
could not regulate private conduct under the fourteenth amendment.5'
Several weeks after the decision in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the
Court invalidated the Virginia Poll Tax in Harper v. Virginia Board of
Elections. The Court held that "[in determining what lines are uncon-
45. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). Chief Justice Warren, speaking for
the Court, stated:
We. . .reject [the] argument that Congress may appropriately do no more than to forbid
violations of the Fifteenth Amendment in general terms. . . .Congress is not circumscribed
by any such artificial rules under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment ....
• ..Congress had found that case-by-case litigation was inadequate to combat widespread
and persistent discrimination in voting ....
Id. at 327-28.
46. Id. at 330-31.
47. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18, provides that Congress has the power "[tlo make all laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers ....
48. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of
Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959); note 25 supra.
49. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326. According to the Chief Justice, the test
to be applied in determining congressional power to legislate pursuant to § 2 of the fifteenth
amendment, was "the same as in all cases concerning the express powers of Congress with relation
to the reserved powers of the States." Id. The classic formulation was laid down fifty years prior
to the ratification of the fifteenth amendment by Chief Justice Marshall:
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which
are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist
with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
50. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 5 provides that "congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."
51. See notes 18 & 22 supra.
7
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stitutionally discriminatory, [the Court has] never been confined to his-
toric notions of equality .... Notions of what constitutes equal
treatment for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do change."52
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment requires ab-
solute equality for rich and poor in matters pertaining to the
franchise.
53
The third voting rights case, Katzenbach v. Morgan, involved the
New York literacy test. 4 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, ap-
plied the same principle to the fourteenth amendment that the Court
had applied to the fifteenth amendment in South Carolina v. Katzen-
bach .5 His opinion indicated that the Court was ready to allow Con-
gress to reach its full potential under the fourteenth, as well as the
fifteenth, amendment. Justice Brennan wrote that section 5 of the four-
teenth amendment gives Congress the power to determine "whether
and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees" of the amend-
ment.5 6 This is true even where Congress attempts to restrict conduct
that is within the reserved powers of the states,57 so long as the purpose
of the federal statute is to secure the states' performance of the four-
teenth amendment duties, regardless of past compliance or the lack of
it. The Court also held that it is within Congress' power to decide
whether a particular state voting requirement is unconstitutionally dis-
criminatory in violation of the fourteenth amendment; that is, Congress
can decide how the general principles of the equal protection clause
apply to actual conditions.5" This case cleared the way for a potentially
vast expansion of Congressional legislation promoting and protecting
human rights in voting, public education, criminal procedure, housing,
and many other areas.
There still remained the question of whether Congress could regulate
unofficial private discrimination. South Carolina v. Katzenbach59 and
Katzenbach v. Morgan60 had dealt specifically and precisely with offi-
cial state conduct, but the question of private conduct arose in two
other cases that were before the Supreme Court at the same time.
52. 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966).
53. Id. at 666.
54. 384 U.S. 641 (1966). At the time of this opinion, the election laws of New York required
an ability to read and write English as a condition of voting. Id. at 644.
55. Id. at 651. See notes 17 & 46 supra.
56. Id. at 651. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § I states that "[tihe right of citizens of the United
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude."
57. Id. at 651. U.S. CONST. amend. X provides that "[tIhe powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people."
58. Id. at 656.
59. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
60. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
8
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These were both criminal cases--terrible criminal cases regarding con-
spiracies which took the lives of three civil rights workers and a Colo-
nel in the United States Army.
In United States v. Price,6' a unanimous Court held that the indict-
ment drawn by the Justice Department was sufficient to state a claim
against seventeen members of the conspiracy although only three of the
conspirators were state officials.62 The language of the opinion is so
clear and so complete that I question whether anyone could quarrel
with the legal reasoning supporting the conclusion. The opinion was
thorough and it was sound. "Private persons, jointly engaged with
state officials in the prohibited action, are acting 'under color' of law for
purposes of the statute. . . It is enough that he is a willful participant
in joint activity with the State or its agents.
63
United States v. Guest' involved a conspiracy in Georgia. Justice
Brennan, himself, faced the issue of whether the criminal statute, 18
U.S.C. § 241,65 applies to actions of private citizens where the state is
not involved. Although Justice Brennan did not write the majority
opinion, he did point out that six of the Justices, in various opinions,
had held that it did.66 He made it clear:
I do not accept-and a majority of the Court today rejects-this inter-
pretation of section 5. It reduces the legislative power to enforce the
provisions of the Amendment to that of the judiciary ....
[S]ection 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment appears as a positive grant
of legislative power, authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in
fashioning remedies to achieve civil and political equality for all citi-
zens .... And I can find no principle of federalism nor a word of the
Constitution that denies Congress power to determine that in order ad-
equately to protect the right to equal utilization of state facilities, it is
also appropriate to punish other individuals-not state officers them-
selves and not acting in concert with state officers-who engage in the
same brutal conduct for the same misguided purpose.67
61. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
62. 383 U.S 787, 799 (1966). The state officials included a sheriff, a deputy sheriff, and a
patrolman. Id. at 790.
63. Id. at 794.
64. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
65. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1976) provides:
Conspiracy against ights of citizens.
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the
free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws
of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same; or
If two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of another, with
intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege so se-
cured-
They shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both;
and if death results, they shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years for life.
66. 383 U.S. at 774, 779-80.
67. Id. at 783-84.
9
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Thus, this decision laid the foundation for new federal legislation
that enabled the Justice Department to more adequately protect blacks
who sought to exercise their constitutional right to equality. The deci-
sion showed that an impartial rule of law could, and would, prevail.
The Warren Court's declaration that Congress has the power to take
action to promote and secure the equality of all citizens was monumen-
tal to the law of equal protection. Having stressed the importance of
that declaration, a discussion of the extent to which Congress author-
ized intrusion into the affairs of the states through the Voting Rights
Act 68 seems necessary. The extent of the intrusion suggests that there is
constitutional authority to make severe and substantial intrusions into
state affairs where Congress determines that such intrusions are needed
and appropriate. The cases I have discussed provided that authority.
One of the least known and perhaps the least understood sections of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 is the provision for federal observers at
polling places in the deep South.69
I wonder how many people realize that the first election following
the passage of the Act in 1965 and the Court's sustaining its constitu-
tionality, was an election for Sheriff of Dallas County, Alabama-
Selma. The day of the election, over five hundred federal observers
were in Dallas County---observers from New York, Milwaukee, Den-
ver, and San Francisco.7" They were civil servants from all over the
country sent to the various polling places in Dallas County to observe
and insure that the elections were properly held. I can think of no par-
ticular act by the federal government that could be a greater intrusion,
even though it was for the limited duration of one day and one election.
The fact remains that a considerable number of people acted under the
authority and direction of the federal government to insure effective
constitutional equality was provided for all citizens in Dallas County.
It was thrilling to see. Remarkably large numbers of black citizens,
men and women, voted for the first time and, for the first time, had
their votes counted and counted fairly.
Finally, I offer my appraisal of Justice Brennan. His opinions in Kat-
zenbach v. Morgan7 I and United States v. Guest7" demonstrate that he
68. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973p (1976).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 1973d (1976). Federal examiners may be sent to any jurisdiction covered by
the provisions of the Voting Rights Act when the Attorney General has received 20 meritorous
written complaints alleging voters are being discriminated against because of race, or when the
Attorney General believes that the appointment of examiners is necessary to enforce the guaran-
tees of the fifteenth amendment. UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING
RIGHTS AcT: TEN YEARS AFTER 30-31 (Jan. 1975).
70. Id. at 398.
71. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
72. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
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is blessed with a remarkable grasp of the Constitution.73 He sees the
contours of the Constitution clearly and accepts no compromise to his
concept of the scope of congressional power. At the same time, when
there is an issue pitting the government against the individual citizen,
he refuses to sacrifice any of the constitutional guarantees of justice and
fair play. He believes strongly in the limits of power and in the separa-
tion of powers, but he also believes that, in spite of clashes on the Court
concerning the limited authority of government over the individual and
in spite of clashes between the executive, legislative, and congressional
powers, the perfection of the Constitution can be demonstrated when
his country is faced with a constitutional crisis. In recognizing the in-
herent dignity of the individual and the equal rights of all citizens, as
well as the duty, the power, and the potential of our system of self-
government to achieve the goal of equal rights for all, Justice Brennan
embodies a clarity of vision that is worthy of the finest of the Justices
on the Supreme Court.
73. See notes 54-58, 66-67 supra.
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